In New Zealand the Clark Labour government
Introduction
This paper draws upon a larger multi-case comparative study of national and sub-national cross-sector policy frameworks (Butcher 2014) . That study adopted an analytical frame based on Kingdon's process streams (Kingdon 1995) and its aim was to investigate: how and why the relationship between governments and the not-for-profit sector came to be regarded as 'problematic' in jurisdictions that had embraced neo-liberal approaches to governance (e.g. new public management or NPM); how the notion of formal cross-sector policy frameworks (beginning with the 1998 'English' Compact) was socialised within policy communities as a preferred policy response to problems with the relationship; the role played by key policy actors (including collective or institutional actors) in the promotion and diffusion of 'compacts' and similar policy instruments; and the connexion between political events, the approach based upon 'thick description' to make sense of the policy process. Insights gained from the interviews were triangulated with relevant primary documents (including numerous official reports, cabinet documents, policy statements, official websites, ministerial press releases and speeches, etc.) and scholarly literatures pertaining to the roles played by nonprofit organisations in the mixed economy of social welfare.
The Ki Tūtahi Relationship Accord in context
New Zealand was an early and enthusiastic adopter of neoliberal approaches to public administration that would come to be called, collectively, new public management (Larner 2000) . The economy-wide reforms initiated by the Lange Labour government (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) provided a platform for the transformation of public sector management (Evans et al. 1996) .
These included an increased reliance on market-oriented strategies such as deregulation, privatisation, outsourcing, the structural separation of purchasers and providers, an enhanced emphasis on performance measurement and management, a shift from input to output-based funding, and the delivery of public services by third parties under contract (Boston et al. 1996; Boston et al. 1999; Boston 2008) .
It was considered that competition would result in greater efficiency, responsiveness and choice in these newly established human services markets and the contract would be the principal instrument by which this competitive turn in service provision would be achieved (Smith 1996; Nowland-Foreman 1997; Ashton et al. 2004; Larner and Craig 2005) . The implementation of contracting and tendering regimes for the provision of health and human services gathered pace under Prime Ministers Bolger and Shipley (1990-1999) whose National governments, according to Larner (2000, p. 17) , exhibited a more recognisable 'authoritarian version of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism'.
By the mid 1990s, however, the National government had begun to reconsider its embrace of pure principal-agent approaches to public service delivery. An incoming government brief prepared by the Department of Social Welfare in 1996 sounded a warning that 'current arrangements with the sector based on purchase-of-service contracting may not, in themselves, be sufficient to maintain a healthy not-for-profit sector' (cited in NowlandForeman 1997, p. 22 ; Department of Social Welfare l996). A view began to emerge that contractual governance was beset with a number of problems and might lead to greater fragmentation of both policy and service delivery; the co-optation of community and voluntary service providers as mere agents of the state; and a lack of focus on the needs of citizens (Smith 1996: p. 16; Nowland-Foreman 1997, p. 34; Aimers and Walker 2008, p. 48) .
The ground was thus prepared for a resurgent opposition Labour Party to foreshadow proposals for a new settlement with New Zealand's community and voluntary sector in the lead-up to the 1999 general election. On taking office in December 1999, the Clark minority Labour/Alliance government (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) signalled a shift away from the 'free market purism' of the Nationals towards a 'social development' approach based on partnership, inclusion and joined-upness (Small 1999; Larner and The Labour/Progressive coalition government that followed (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) continued the process of policy review and implementation. However, signs had begun to emerge that the community services sector and the government had divergent views: whereas the government clearly wanted to develop a framework document along the lines of the compacts then in place in the UK, the sector hedged, having concluded that the time was not right for a formal agreement on an equal footing with government (CVSWP 2001).
The government established a Community Sector Taskforce to consult with the sector and to provide independent advice to government about progressing recommendations flowing from the earlier working groups (O'Brien et al. 2009) . The relationship between the Taskforce and the government was sometimes difficult, owing in part to the former's firm commitment to embedding the government-sector relationship within a broader Tiriti/Treaty of Waitangi framework (O'Brien et al. 2009, p. 20 Following the 2005 general election, the Labour/Progressive coalition government continued to address cross-cutting issues of practical concern to the sector. By 2007, perhaps sensing a possible change of government at the next election, the community sector signalled that as 'our "official" knowledge of the tangata whenua, community and voluntary sector is very much greater now than it was when the Statement of Government Intent was released', it was now time for the SoGI to 'become a formal basis for action and accountability and a 
Framing the problem
By the time of the 1999 election the 'neoliberalisation' of New Zealand's community services sector was well underway (O'Brien et al. 2009, p. 26) . This new dispensation based on marketisation and contractual governance introduced a range of problems. The administrative and compliance apparatus of contracting imposed operational burdens and practical constraints on the sector (O'Brien et al. 2009, pp. 28-29) . Although government came to depend on community and voluntary sector providers as never before, the influence of the sector as a collective policy actor was simultaneously eroded by its engagement in the new contract culture.
The election of the Clark Labour government presented an opportunity to re-set government's relationship with the sector. New Zealand's inaugural Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Steve Maharey spoke of the 'almost complete breakdown' of the relationship between Government and the community and voluntary sector. This he attributed to:
Unthinking adherence to a rigid contracting model, centralised needs identification and programme specification, and an unwillingness to acknowledge the independence of sector groups over the last decade (Maharey 2000d ).
Shortly after coming to power, the Clark government established a Community and Umbrella organisations such as the Association of Non-Governmental Organisations of Aotearoa (ANGOA) continued to highlight the adverse impacts upon the sector of organisational fragmentation in government and the inconsistent application of policy (ANGOA 2009, pp. 35-36 December).
The trajectory of the government-sector relationship from the 1980s is encapsulated in Figure  1 below.
The policy discourse
By the late 1990s policy actors within and outside government were cognisant of the impact of new public management-inspired reforms on New Zealand's community and voluntary sector (Nowland-Foreman 1997) . Furthermore, policy initiatives afoot in the United Kingdom 1 It should be noted that the charge of 'fragmentation' to some extent flies in the face of practical realities. As noted by the Controller and Auditor-General, procedural guidance 'cannot be applied equally in all circumstances' and attempts to apply uniform processes can 'sometimes be counter-productive' (Office of the Auditor General 2006). and Canada to establish more constructive relationships between government and the third sector sharpened the concerns of New Zealand policy actors about the implications of continued policy neglect in the not-for-profit policy space (Maharey 2000d; Prestidge 2010) . Maharey advocated a 'genuine and active partnership' with community-based social service providers, noting the 'mistrust and insecurity' that had characterised government relations with the community sector (Maharey 2000a) . He encouraged the sector to 'seize this opportunity to work in genuine partnership with the Government' (Maharey 2000a) and outlined the task ahead in the following terms:
The challenge for this Government, and for community-based providers, is to build a strong professional relationship based on trust, accountability and respect. We need to clearly assign accountabilities and responsibilities and to secure the right of both parties to hold independent views (Maharey 2000a ).
The sector, however, harboured reservations about the prospects for a compact. New
Zealand's national umbrella organisations had come to the view that that no one organisation, or even a coalition of organisations had the authority to make commitments on behalf of the wider sector. As one sector representative put it:
2 Steve Maharey, Minister for Social Services and Employment from 1999-2003 made the following observations: 'In the United Kingdom, high level agreements have been achieved between the Government and the voluntary and community sectors in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Each of these agreements (called 'compacts') has been developed along similar lines but through consultation processes better suited to each region. The implementation of these 'compacts' has been dropped down to the local government level and it is there that their future will be determined. Canada has taken a different route to consultation by establishing Joint Tables, which have outlined a series of methods to encourage development of the sector and promote collaboration with government. Community and voluntary organisations in both countries have been drawn to these approaches in response to central Government's withdrawal from providing a range of services. Along with this expanded role for the not-for-profit sector has come the demand for increased accountability from government and the pressures that brings. These pressures have placed substantial strain on the whole voluntary sector infrastructure. In New Zealand, the Government has already flagged a need to re-examine the nature of contracts in dialogue with community and iwi organisations. In addition, a project to find practical ways to minimise funding compliance costs is also in progress.' (Maharey 2000d) (Prestidge 2010, pp. 75-76) .
In 2002 Maharey committed the Labour government to 'practical and workable steps that will make a real difference for people who work in the community sector' (Maharey 2002) . The sector, however, called for 'holistic' reform which included coupling any future framework agreement with 'political and constitutional issues relating to the Iwi-Crown Treaty relationship' (CGRSG 2002, pp. 7-9) .
the Labour-led government than it was prepared to risk. This set the stage for the National-led government elected in 2008 opting to by-pass national umbrella groups by engaging directly with communities and community-based organisations.
The politics of cross-sector rapprochement
Until the 1980s, New Zealand had a reputation as an archetypal 'welfare state' and a pioneering 'social laboratory' characterised by generous social payments, industry subsidies and high levels of regulation (Tennant et al. 2008) . From the 1950s through to the 1970s New Zealand consolidated and extended its welfare state. During this period funding for community and voluntary sector organisations increased dramatically -in the process greatly expanding both the number and diversity of organisations established to fill perceived gaps in service provision or to advocate on behalf of particular groups or causes (Tennant et al. 2008 ).
This new generation of politically assertive not-for-profit organisations was more prepared than the older established charitable bodies to challenge the status quo and offer criticisms of government policy (Tennant et al. 2008, pp. 27-29) .
Meanwhile, a sector-wide voice failed to coalesce, possibly owing to a general acceptance at that time of the central role of the state in ensuring the welfare of citizens (Twyford 2008 Beginning in the mid-1980s contracts steadily superceded untied grants as the preferred mechanism for directing government funding to community and voluntary organisations (Tennant et al. 2008; O'Brien et al. 2009 ). The ascendancy of procurement approaches to service delivery, coupled with resource scarcity, severely tested community and voluntary sector organisations, many of which felt that state requirements increasingly shaped their priorities and subverted their mission and values (Tennant et al. 2008, p. 31; O'Brien et al. 2009, p. 15) . The advent of partnership discourses in the UK and Canada, and the adoption of formal cross-sector frameworks in both countries (Butcher et al. 2012 ) awakened interest in a reappraisal of the sector's relationship with the state (O'Brien et al. 2009, p. 14) .
By the end of the 1990s there were indications that the Bolger/Shipley National government alia, 'play a lead in working with other government agencies to develop relationship plans with the NGOs they work with' (Turia 2003a; 2003b) and provide guidance for public servants on good community engagement practices (Turia 2003c ). eight years on [from the SoGI] it is entirely appropriate that we reflect on the structures and the processes that have been built to create strong and respectful relationships with each other -and evaluate progress made, and developments yet to occur (Turia 2009 ). 7 The establishment of the OCVS was initially welcomed by the sector as a gesture of the government's 'determination to improve the relationship between government agencies and community, voluntary and tangata whenua organisations (OCVS 2003) . However, the OCVS was later criticised as 'a small, low-level unit' with 'neither the status, nor the resources to address the New Zealand public sector's lack of capacity for collaboration and coordination across agencies and departments' nor the 'levers' to achieve a 'whole of Not long after, the OCVS ceased to exist as a separate office and its functions were integrated within existing operations of the DIA. A week after the Accord was signed, the government announced its intention to disestablish New Zealand's charity regulator, the Charity Commission, and transfer its functions to the DIA from 1 July 2012 (DIA n/d) leading the sector to claim that Kia Tutahi had 'failed its first test' (Scoop 2011).
An Accord, but between whom?
Unlike formal cross-sector relationship frameworks in other jurisdictions, the Accord does not take the form of a bilateral framework agreement. Rather, it is presented as being 'between the Communities of Aotearoa New Zealand and the Government of New Zealand'
and is described as 'an important symbol of commitment between the government and communities to engage effectively to achieve social, economic, cultural and environmental outcomes' (DIA 2015a). Moreover, the Steering Group claimed that those attending local and regional forums expressed a clear preference for the term communities because it 'encompasses organisations, families and individuals' (KTSG 2010) . A senior official with the OCVS echoed this view:
It's not what a lot of people expected, but, it did get a lot of support around the country ... quite a few people have an affinity with the word 'communities' and feel more allied to that concept, in terms of their contributing to their communities, than they do to the term community and voluntary sector (2010, senior official, OCVS, pers. comm., 14 December).
The same official also observed that people and organisations located outside New Zealand's metropolitan centres, or situated within Māori and Pacific Islander communities, would not necessarily recognise themselves as being part of a community and voluntary sector: rather, 10 Formerly the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations.
they see themselves as a community (2010, senior official, OCVS, pers. comm., 14 December).
11
The decision to frame the Accord as a covenant between the government and 'communities' is, in part, a reflection of New Zealand's distinctive political culture in which central government is dominant and national umbrella organisations are relatively weak. This is not to suggest that there is not a vibrant civil society sector in New Zealand. However, it appears that many community and voluntary organisations consider that they have a direct relationship with central government unmediated by peak organisations purporting to represent the collective views and positions of the sector. This is both a legacy of New
Zealand's bold experiment with orthodox principal-agent contracting and a reflection of the practical reality of the 'coalface' relationships between civil society actors and central government functionaries in regions and local communities.
It was clear throughout the consultation period that key national umbrella organisations had no great love for this proposed framework. It has been suggested that national umbrella organisations wanted an agreement that would set out an implementation framework in the form of an action plan to resolve a checklist of historical grievances in a way that binds ministers and the government (2010, senior official, DIA, pers. comm., 15 December).
Certainly, the form and direction taken by the agreement-making process departed significantly from what was envisaged by previous cross-sector working groups.
SoGI and the Relationship Accord compared
If anything, the Accord is expressed at an even greater level of generality than the SoGI as indicated in a submission on the initial draft:
11 The relationship between government, the NFP sector and the 'tāngata whenua' is a 'vexed' one with constitutional and sovereignty implications for Māori. Although there has been strong community sector support for 'separate and related Māori and non-Māori work streams' in relation to government-sector relationships this has 'always been resisted by the government' (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 December). According to the sector, it is only with the advent of contracting that one sees the emergence of Māori organisations that are not 'iwi based' (ibid). And although some Māori engage with policy processes via Pakeha organisations, more 'traditional' Māori regard the Treaty of Waitangi as their primary relationship with the Crown -a relationship that in the eyes of Māori is about shared governance (2010, senior government official DIA, pers. comm., 15 December). In that light, instruments such as the Relationship Accord are considered to be largely irrelevant to their interests (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 December).
The 2001 Statement was already at a relatively high level of generalisation on these commitments, allocating just a brief summary paragraph to each, and needed to be put into more specific and hence accountable commitments. However, in most cases they disappear, or (at best) are reduced to even more vague sentences in the Draft Relationship Agreement (Nowland-Foreman 2010) .
Observing that the draft 'notably fails to take up any of the 15 Never intended to serve as a vehicle for systemic and structural reform, the Accord's purpose is expressed largely in aspirational terms:
Communities and government are increasingly working together to navigate the cultural, social, environmental and economic challenges for our society. In this context, the Relationship Accord supports the building of strong relationships between communities and government, with benefits accessible to all, so that we can jointly achieve our vision (OCVS 2012a).
By invoking principles of individual and collective conduct that transcend the governmentsector relationship, the Accord goes beyond the narrow instrumentalist aims of relationship frameworks in other jurisdictions. Yet, the aspirational terms in which it is expressed render it ineffective as a policy lever.
The core differences between the SoGI and the Accord are subtle. For example, the former outlined a communitarian project in which government, community, voluntary and Iwi/Māori organisations would work together to achieve shared goals. Although the Accord does talk about government and communities working together to navigate cultural, social, environmental and economic challenges, overall its language tends to reinforce the hegemony of government. The words 'partner' or 'partnership' do not appear.
Whereas the SoGI recognised community sector leadership, the Accord de-emphasises community and voluntary sector organisations whilst elevating the value of voluntary effort.
The SoGI contained broad commitments to achieve change in areas such as the culture of government, a whole-of-government approach, participation in decision-making, funding and building sector capacity. Apart from a undertaking to 'jointly resolve longstanding matters of concern, such as, participation in decision-making around policy and service delivery issues, and funding arrangements' the Accord sets out no priorities for action. Neither document makes any commitment to a process for implementation or on-going stewardship/governance of the framework. The Accord contains undertakings to be respectful and honest, act in good faith, work cooperatively and pursue good practices, and in this respect it more resembles a guide for good manners than a relationship framework.
Nevertheless, as one representative of a national umbrella group observed:
Negotiating the agreement is more important than the agreement … This is a process -the Relationship Agreement isn't actually all that important -because in the process we have made huge gains … So you can just keep this bloody thing going, you don't need an end-point because relationships are improving (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 December).
These sentiments echo a widely shared view that the need for a formal relationship framework has been gradually overtaken by real improvements in the government-sector relationship (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 December).
Whither (or wither?) Kia Tutahi?
Following the November 2011 general election that led to the National Party retaining government (albeit through confidence and supply agreements with ACT, United Future and the Māori Party) the newly appointed Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Jo Goodhew, affirmed the government's commitment to the Accord: I see Kia Tūtahi as a lever for positive change where some government organisations may be lagging behind others to engage and work with the nongovernment sector. Many agencies will find, as some have already found, that the Accord is easily embraced into the way they do things from developing policies right through to the delivery of services to people around New Zealand (Goodhew 2012a ).
The Accord, she said, establishes a framework and sets expectations for how the government and community groups can work together more effectively (Goodhew 2012a ).
The DIA was directed to 'focus on improving efficiencies for community organisations by providing better access to grants, reducing compliance costs, and streamlining grant funding processes' (Goodhew 2012b ours [is] a classic Third Way government -committed to a market economy, but not to a market society. New Zealand is, after all, a nation, not just an economy. And advanced nations must address broader hopes and aspirations for inclusion, participation, empowerment, fairness, opportunity, security, and identity -as we are doing (Clark 2000) .
The inaugural minister for the voluntary and community sector, Steve Maharey was instrumental in placing a framework agreement on the policy agenda. However, the government and the sector had divergent views about the model and the scope of any settlement.
The community and voluntary sector wanted a settlement, but two important factors placed a compact out of immediate reach: first, it was concluded that the sector in New Zealand was not sufficiently developed to enter into a compact on equal terms with government; and second, there was an entrenched view among national umbrella organisations that any settlement with the sector must occur as part of a broader settlement with Iwi/Māori and would therefore entail a long-term program culminating in profound institutional reform.
The policy window opened once more when Tariana Turia took over the portfolio in 2002.
Although Turia was not driven by adherence to 'Third Way' ideology in the same way as her However, it seems that the national umbrella organisations overreached by seeking to bind the government to a comprehensive settlement that included treaty issues and institutionalised mechanisms for compliance and monitoring. As a result, Turia by-passed the national umbrella organisations and sought a new consensus by pitching the proposed Relationship Agreement/Accord directly to communities and organisations working at the coalface. The role of the already politically weak national umbrella organisations was thus demoted to that of just another stakeholder with no formal standing in the deliberative process.
In the end the National government supplanted Labour's aspirational 'Third Way' rhetoric with an emphasis on pragmatic administrative and systemic reforms. Although the Kia Tūtahi Relationship Accord's evocations of community are infused with a kind of conservative romanticism, there are as yet few indications that the Accord has resonated with communities, the community and voluntary sector or the state sector.
